Enforcement of dynamic HTTP policies on resource-constrained residential gateways by Bonafiglia, Roberto et al.
04 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
Enforcement of dynamic HTTP policies on resource-constrained residential gateways / Bonafiglia, Roberto; Sapio,
Amedeo; Baldi, Mario; Risso, FULVIO GIOVANNI OTTAVIO; Pomi, Paolo C.. - In: COMPUTER NETWORKS. - ISSN
1389-1286. - STAMPA. - 123(2017), pp. 169-183.
Original
Enforcement of dynamic HTTP policies on resource-constrained residential gateways
Publisher:
Published
DOI:10.1016/j.comnet.2017.05.016
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2679585 since: 2017-09-10T01:22:07Z
Elsevier
Enforcement of Dynamic HTTP Policies on
Resource-constrained Residential Gateways
Roberto Bonafigliaa, Amedeo Sapioa,∗, Mario Baldia, Fulvio Rissoa, Paolo C.
Pomib
aDepartment of Control and Computer Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, Italy
bEnnova, Torino, Italy
Abstract
Given that nowadays users access content mostly through mobile apps and
web services, both based on HTTP, several filtering applications, such as pa-
rental control, malware detection, and corporate policy enforcement, require
inspecting Universal Resource Locators (URLs) contained in HTTP requests.
Currently, such filtering is most commonly performed in end devices or in mid-
dleboxes. Filtering applications running on end devices are less resource in-
tensive because they operate only on traffic from a single user and possibly
leverage a hook at the HTTP level to access protocol data, but it is left to
the user whether to execute them. On the other hand, middleboxes present
the challenge of ensuring that they lay on the path of all the traffic from any
relevant device. Residential gateways seem to be the ideal place where to imple-
ment traffic filtering because they forward all traffic generated by the hosts on
home(-office) networks. However, these devices usually have very limited com-
putation and memory resources, while URL-based filtering is quite demanding.
In fact existing approaches rely on a large database of rules coupled with either
deep packet inspection or transparent proxying for URL extraction.
This paper introduces U-Filter, a URL filtering solution based on a dis-
tributed architecture where a lightweight, efficient URL extraction and policy
enforcement component runs on residential gateways, delegating to a remote
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policy server the resource intensive task of verifying policy compliance. Thanks
to the lightweight communication between the two components and the very
limited resource requirements of the local module, U-Filter (i) can be deployed
on resource-limited devices such as residential gateways, and (ii) has almost
no impact on the performance of the device, as well as on the users’ browsing
experience, as demonstrated by the experiments presented in the paper.
Keywords: Deep packet inspection, Policy enforcement, Residential gateway,
URL filtering
1. Introduction
Modern residential gateways are widely deployed to provide broadband In-
ternet access to families, small and medium-sized enterprises supporting a wide
range of data rates, from a few Mbps up to 1 Gbps [1]. The architecture of resi-
dential gateways is characterized by special purpose hardware chips that forward
packets at high speed at the data link layer, while general-purpose components,
such as CPU and central memory, are usually employed for other operations
that require more sophisticated processing. Since all the traffic directed to In-
ternet hosts (i.e., outside the residential or corporate branch network) must
pass through the residential gateway, it is the ideal appliance to apply traf-
fic filtering. Hence, its processing capabilities, often underutilized, could be
leveraged by Internet access service providers to offer such additional service to
their customers. However, the limited computing and memory resources that
residential gateways have by design make the implementation of new features
working at wire-speed very challenging, particularly when complex operations
such as parsing packets up to the application layer (a.k.a. Deep Packet Inspec-
tion or DPI) are involved. This is the case for many critical modern filtering
applications, such as malware protection, corporate policy enforcement, paren-
tal control, advertisement block, that are based on inspection and filtering of
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). In fact, users access and exchange content
mostly through mobile apps and web applications, both based on HTTP, which
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uses URLs to identify data objects to be transferred.
Currently, the above URL filtering-based services are most often operated
in web proxies [2] or in end-user devices (e.g., laptop, tablet, smartphone), as
a mobile app [3] or a browser plugin [4]. None of these solutions can guarantee
that all the outgoing traffic is analyzed and filtered; in fact, a user can switch
to a different device, disable the filtering software or change the client network
settings in order to bypass a web proxy. The residential gateway is the perfect
spot where to implement services that require all the web page requests to be
analyzed. This would require matching URLs against large, dynamic blacklists,
which far exceeds the limited hardware capabilities of this category of devices.
For example, an effective parental control service, which is a valuable offer to
residential customers, is based on a very large database of URLs that cannot
be stored in the limited memory of common residential gateways (usually in
the order of tens of MB). An additional challenge comes from the fact that
the database must be frequently updated. Last but not least, URL matching
cannot be limited to the hostname, but the entire URL should be considered
because the same web server can host both appropriate and inappropriate or
malicious pages. Hence, looking up a URL within a huge list of blocked resources
exceeds the processing capabilities of a residential gateway, especially if it must
be done for live traffic, which implies that the additional introduced delay must
be limited.
This paper presents U-Filter, an efficient solution to integrate a URL filtering
service in a resource constrained device, such as a common residential gateway,
leveraging a distributed architecture. A remote policy server in charge of keeping
the URL database up-to-date provides a fast API that can be accessed through
the network in order to establish if a request for a specific URL is allowed. It is
reasonable that the above mentioned server is operated by a service provider (or
the network service provider) and can rely on powerful hardware resources to
serve multiple residential gateways with minimal response time. However, this
architecture does not necessarily require the network service provider awareness
and collaboration. The presented solution greatly alleviates the load on each
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residential gateway, even though it must still perform a limited form of DPI on
outgoing packets to extract the URL from every HTTP request, and afterwards
query the server in order to determine the policy that must be applied. We adopt
specific techniques to optimize this task and limit the latency introduced by the
client-server interaction, striking a balance between the load they introduce and
the limited resources available in residential gateways. Although the U-Filter
design and the adopted optimizations are presented here in the context of policy
enforcement on HTTP traffic, they offer a general solution for in-network policy
enforcement suitable for a wide range of network protocols, thanks in particular
to the decoupling of policy checking and enforcement phases, as detailed in
Section 2.2.2.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the architecture of
U-Filter, describing the design principles that led to our solution and the opti-
mizations used to provide real-time policy enforcement on resource-constrained
devices. In section 3 we evaluate the proposed solution by discussing its limi-
tations and analyzing the additional delay introduced by U-Filter. We validate
U-Filter in Section 4 through various experiments showing the impact on the
user experience. Section 5 presents the state of the art of HTTP-level policy en-
forcement and Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of future research
directions.
2. Architecture and implementation
2.1. Operating principles
A typical deployment scenario of U-Filter is presented in Figure 1. A user
surfing the web generates many HTTP requests that transit through her/his
residential gateway. These requests are analyzed by U-Filter, which extracts the
requested URL through a lightweight DPI algorithm. This allows to process line
rate traffic with a small overhead for the residential gateway. Afterwards the
HTTP request is released and can continue its journey towards the web server,
while the URL is simultaneously sent to the policy server that provides the
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Figure 1: U-Filter workflow.
policy to enforce. This policy is enforced by U-Filter on the packet carrying the
HTTP response by either blocking or allowing it. Thanks to the parallelization
of the policy server and web server processing, this workflow greatly reduces the
latency experienced by the user, making it comparable with the one that can
be obtained with the same hardware without the service in place.
2.2. Architecture overview and design principles
Our prototype has been built around three objectives. First comes flexi-
bility, as it is essential to be able to enforce effective protection to end users
in a prompt response to newly discovered threats. Second is efficiency since
the system is targeted to resource-constrained devices. Third, we took care of
ensuring an excellent user experience, hence limiting the impact of the system
in terms of possible additional latency when inspecting traffic to apply filtering
policies. The above high-level objectives have translated in the following four
design choices.
2.2.1. Three-tier processing architecture
As shown in Figure 2, U-Filter includes (i) an online module, which sits
on the data plane of the router and is mainly in charge of identifying (and
extracting) requested URLs from network traffic (more details in Section 2.5)
and apply the policy decisions on the return traffic, (ii) an offline module that
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Figure 2: U-Filter architecture.
queries a remote policy server to know whether such URL should be allowed
or not (described in Section 2.6), and (iii) a remote server that implements
the complex protection logic and returns a boolean value with the result of the
classification, i.e., if the corresponding HTTP session handled by the online
module has to be allowed or the URL is malicious and the response has to be
blocked. The first two modules are built with efficiency in mind, while the latter
allows to achieve the required flexibility.
The U-Filter online module is inserted on the path that packets being for-
warded by the residential gateway take through the system. It leverages a hook
provided by the netfilter [5] framework, as detailed in Section 2.3, available in
the mainline Linux kernel, to enable interaction with the IP forwarding function.
To achieve high performance, the online module is executed in the kernel space;
this allows to avoid expensive kernel-to-user context switching and enables shar-
ing the required data structures with the rest of the kernel (e.g., direct access
to privileged memory areas), hence minimizing communication overheads. In
fact, by working in kernel space, the online module can implement a zero-copy
approach, since the data structure containing the packet data is not copied in
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the user space memory and is only referenced by the online module. On the
other hand, the offline module is invoked a limited number of times compared
to the online module because it operates only when a new URL is detected,
but it requires more time to complete due to its interaction with the (remote)
policy server. As a consequence, an asynchronous execution model is preferred
for this module in order not to block the execution of the data path. This could
be implemented as either a dedicated kernel thread or as a user-space process,
which is the solution chosen in our implementation1 because of the complexity
of the tasks it executes and to avoid that any possible misbehavior (or bug)
can be propagated to the kernel, hence affecting the overall operation of the
residential gateway.
The policy server can be executed on a remote host (or on a cluster of hosts
for performance reasons), as its only interaction with the rest of the system
is through a query/response protocol. A single policy server can be queried by
offline modules running on multiple (remotely distributed) residential gateways.
In our implementation, this interaction has been implemented with the ad-hoc
dedicated protocol detailed in Section 2.7, but other choices (e.g., REST web
service) are surely possible.
2.2.2. Decoupling policy verification from HTTP operation
As introduced in Section 2.1, policy compliance is verified without hold-
ing outgoing packets on their ride towards the final destination. This solution
makes the system more complicated but much more efficient. In fact, keeping
the HTTP request on hold until the arrival of the response from the policy
server would add additional delay to the HTTP communication, increasing the
Round Trip Time (RTT) of the HTTP connection and hence affecting the user
experience. Vice versa, the U-Filter offline module checks the requested URL
with the policy server during the normal HTTP RTT. A temporary entry in an
1In fact, a small portion of the offline module has to be implemented anyway in the kernel
space, as shown in Section 2.6.
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HTTP session table is created by the online module in order to possibly hold a
response from the web server received before the result of the compliance check
arrives from policy server. While this allows packets to travel through the In-
ternet also if they are part of a session that shall be stopped, the answer from
the web server never reaches the user, effectively preventing possible unwanted
data to reach the user’s host.
2.2.3. Efficient memory usage
Efficient memory usage is a key problem because of (i) the limited amount of
memory usually available in current residential gateways, and (ii) the bad effects
in terms of CPU cache pollution when large memory structures (with sparse
access patterns) are used. Several implementation choices have been adopted
to ensure that memory is used efficiently. According to the best practice for
kernel module development, all the memory used by the online U-Filter module
is allocated at startup in order to avoid costly memory allocations at run-time,
and the structures that are used for the communication between online and
offline modules are shared (using the proper primitives for mapping memory
between kernel and user space) for better memory efficiency. Furthermore, all
the helper structures (detailed in Section 2.4) make use of contiguous memory
areas in order to improve data locality and, as a result, CPU cache efficiency,
except for the packets that may need to be held temporarily by U-Filter (while
waiting for an answer from the policy server), which have been allocated by
other portions of the kernel and therefore are not under our control. Finally,
the usage of additional memory is kept at minimum: (a) the data structure
dedicated to the session table defines a “default” behavior that avoids storing
accepted sessions, and (b) the number of packets held by the router while waiting
for the answer from the policy server is limited to, at most, one per session,
hence further reducing memory requirements.
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2.2.4. Per-packet operation
This is known to be much more efficient than per-TCP session processing
while, at the same time, reducing the latency required to extract application
level information (namely URLs). In fact, the former can be based directly
on the very efficient packet processing primitives available in the Linux kernel
through the netfilter framework, instead of requiring a full-blown HTTP
proxy, whose complexity is so high to make a kernel implementation problematic.
Therefore, an additional overhead is added for moving all packets from kernel
to user space, where a proxy is usually located, and then back to kernel for their
transmission on the output interface.
As a downside, working on individual packets makes the system less robust
against malicious attacks such as HTTP requests whose URLs are split across
packets (possibly deliberately sent out of order). Such attacks could be spotted
by adding lightweight, packet-based ad-hoc anomaly detection algorithms [6, 7,
8], which is outside of the scope of this paper.
2.3. Netfilter
In order to gain access to live traffic, U-Filter leverages netfilter [5], a
framework provided in the mainline Linux kernel that allows analyzing and
modifying all the packets that are being received by the kernel. netfilter
defines a set of hooks that correspond to different stages in the path packets
take in the system. An application can register one or more callbacks linked
to a specific hook; the corresponding callbacks are invoked whenever a packet
passes through it. The callback receives a pointer to the system data structure
containing the packet’s data as a parameter, therefore it can read and modify
the packet. Finally, the returned value instructs the system on whether the
packet can continue its journey (NF ACCEPT), or should be immediately dropped
(NF DROP), or should be diverted to a different (custom) processing pipeline
(NF STOLEN), which is useful if the decision about accepting/dropping the packet
has to be postponed.
Figure 3 shows the possible paths taken by packets, together with the hooks
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Figure 3: netfilter hooks chain and U-Filter.
that can be used to register callbacks. All the incoming packets are caught by
the NF IP PRE ROUTING hook, before being processed by the routing task; after-
wards, packets addressed to the host itself are caught by the NF IP LOCAL IN
hook, while those traversing the host on their way toward the destination hit the
NF IP FORWARD hook (where U-Filter is attached). The NF IP LOCAL OUT hook
catches packets sent by the host’s local processes, while the NF IP POST ROUTING
hook catches all the outgoing packets, whether they are forwarded or locally
generated.
2.4. Key data structures
The online and offline modules exchange data using three shared structures,
as shown in Figure 2: (i) a hash map for the status of the policy for a given
session, (ii) a queue for the URLs that have to be send to the policy server and
(iii) a queue with the verdict received from the policy server. Each of the data
structures is described in detail in the reminder of this section, while their usage
will be discussed in the following sections.
The HTTP session table (shown in Figure 4) stores data regarding pending
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Figure 5: URL queue, shared between the online module and the offline module user space
process.
sessions. An HTTP session is considered pending when the HTTP request has
been received, but either the HTTP response from the web server or the decision
from the policy server are yet to be received. The hash map implementing the
HTTP session table is allocated in kernel space and is shared between the online
and offline module because the former needs to know (when an HTTP response
arrives) whether a decision for an URL has been received, while the latter needs
to know, when the verdict is available, whether an HTTP response is already
waiting. An entry in the HTTP session table can be deleted as soon as both
the HTTP response and the verdict from the policy server have been received.
The URL queue (shown in Figure 5) is shared between the online module
and the offline module user space process, while the verdict queue (shown in
Figure 6) is shared between the kernel thread and the user space process of the
offline module. The two queues are managed according to a FIFO policy and
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the access to each queue is implemented with two pointers, pointing respectively
at the first free and the first full slot.
To correlate data in different data structures, an entry always contains a key
made by the 4 tuple identifying the TCP session (later referred as session ID):
(Source IP,Destination IP, Source TCP port, Destination TCP port)
The addresses are the ones present in the HTTP request and are inverted in the
corresponding HTTP response.
An entry in the URL queue contains also the URL that should be checked
with the policy server, while an entry in the verdict queue contains a session sta-
tus flag that assumes either ACCEPT or DROP, according to the policy to enforce.
The URL is stored in some pre-allocated memory whose size allows containing
a full-length HTTP payload (i.e., 1460 bytes), in order to avoid memory alloca-
tions at run-time. On the other hand, an entry in the HTTP session table stores
as value a session status flag and a void pointer to a packet (skbuff structure,
allocated by the operating system). The use of this pointer is detailed in Sec-
tion 2.5. Differently from the verdict queue, the session status flag in the HTTP
session table can assume either UNKNOWN or DROP. In fact, entries corresponding
to an ACCEPT policy are deleted as soon as the verdict is available in order to
reduce the size of the hash table. Thus, in the HTTP session table the absence
of an entry is considered as an ACCEPT policy.
As a further optimization to reduce the allocated memory, in our prototype
the TCP session ID uses only the last byte of the source IP address, instead
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of the entire 4 bytes address, with no impact on the system proper execution.
This optimization is correct in our environment, since domestics LANs usually
adopt a 24 bits subnet, therefore all the clients have the same value for the first
3 bytes of the IP address. In general this is not valid for every deployment,
hence the optimization should be adapted to the specific addressing plan in use.
2.5. Online module
The online module sits on the data path by intercepting all the traffic
forwarded by the router through a callback registered on the NF IP FORWARD
netfilter hook2. As shown by the workflow depicted in Figure 7, most of
the processing occurs when an HTTP request or response is detected. For each
packet, the module first locates the beginning of the TCP payload and then
checks if that packet can be considered the first segment of an HTTP request
or response by matching the beginning of the TCP payload against a few sim-
ple text strings, namely an HTTP method (i.e., GET, POST, PUT, etc.) in
case of a request or a version string (i.e., HTTP/1.0 or HTTP/1.1) in case of
a response. This classification method is far more reliable than checking the
transport-layer port number, as investigated in [9]. All other packets, namely
HTTP packets that are not the first of the request/response message (hence, do
not match the signature), as well as non-HTTP traffic, are left to continue their
way as the online module returns NF ACCEPT to netfilter. Notably, since all
TCP packets containing a valid payload are matched against the signature, this
algorithm is able to intercept all the HTTP requests/responses that are issued
within a connection in HTTP 1.1 persistent mode, not only the first one, as well
as within HTTP connections terminated on a non-standard TCP port. This
algorithm could raise concerns about the cost of inspecting all packets, as gen-
eral DPI techniques are normally demanding in terms of computing resources.
However, our algorithm does not perform a full-blown DPI with full parsing of
2By choice, U-Filter does not apply policies to the packets that are received and generated
by the router itself, e.g., for management purposes.
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Figure 7: Summarized workflow of the online module.
all protocol headers and their fields. Instead, it performs a lightweight parsing
to locate the beginning of the TCP payload and a string checking (instead of
regular expressions) just on the initial bytes of the payload, which is a rea-
sonable assumption that is discussed in Section 3.1. In fact, our experimental
validation (Section 4.3, Figure 13) confirms that the online module does not
introduce noticeable overhead in the traffic processing.
In case of an HTTP request, the URL is extracted and sent to the offline
module by pushing a new entry in the (shared) URL queue (Figure 5), which
includes the TCP session identifier to later match the verdict from the policy
server with the corresponding HTTP session. A new entry is also created in the
HTTP session table; as shown in Figure 4, it includes the TCP session identifier
(as a key), a session status flag that is marked as UNKNOWN, and an additional
field that is left empty. Afterwards the packet is allowed to be forwarded by
returning NF ACCEPT to netfilter.
When an HTTP response is received, the module checks the status in the
HTTP session table and acts according to the three possible scenarios:
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• The lookup is successful and the requested URL is forbidden (DROP in the
session status flag). The HTTP response is dropped (i.e., a NF DROP is
returned to netfilter), and two new packets are generated: (i) a TCP
RESET message sent to the web server to forcibly close the connection
and (ii) an HTTP redirect message sent to the client in order to show the
user a courtesy web page notifying that the requested web resource was
blocked. Moreover the entry is removed by the HTTP session table.
• The lookup is successful but the system is still waiting for the policy
server to respond (UNKNOWN in the session status flag). This occurs when
the response from the web server arrives before the one from the policy
server. In this case the HTTP response packet is put on hold by returning
NF STOLEN to netfilter and saved in the proper skbuff structure (shown
in Figure 4) of the HTTP session table entry, waiting for the arrival of
the answer from the policy server. This is the only case in which the
user experiences an additional delay compared to a scenario where U-
Filter is not deployed; a characterization of this delay will be provided in
Section 3.3.
• The lookup is unsuccessful. Our algorithm interprets this condition as the
URL being allowed, hence the HTTP response is forwarded to the client.
Since in common URL filtering applications most URLs are not to be
blocked, this design choice allows considerable space savings in the HTTP
session table (Figure 4), as we avoid explicit entries for all the sessions
that correspond to ‘accepted’ URLs.
Notably, the algorithm needs to hold (hence, store in the kernel session ta-
ble) no more than one packet per HTTP session. In fact, even if other segments
of the HTTP answer are in fact delivered to the destination, the TCP layer
on the destination host cannot reconstruct the entire message because of the
missing packet, which is the first segment of the HTTP response. This prevents
the message to be actually delivered to the application (e.g., web browser) while
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keeping at minimum the memory storage requirements in the residential gate-
way. However, this solution also causes the transmission of some duplicated
packets, which we analyze in Section 4.2 and that are discarded by U-Filter
since they are equal to the packet already on hold.
2.6. Offline module
As depicted in Figure 2, the offline module is split in two portions, the first
one operating as a process in user space, while the other operates as a thread
in kernel space. The former is in charge of the communication with the policy
server, as shown in Figure 8, while the latter executes the workflow summarized
in Figure 9.
U-Filter 
(offline module)
Worker1
U-Filter 
policy server
Listening
TCP-Socket
2 TCP Connections
Worker2
URL queue
Verdict queue
Figure 8: Offline module user space process.
The user space process retrieves URLs from the URL queue and sends them
to the policy server, which provides decisions stating whether they are accept-
able or to be blocked. These decisions are then pushed in the shared verdict
queue, together with the same TCP session identifier that was stored in the
corresponding URL queue entry.
The entries in the verdict queue are retrieved by the offline module thread in
kernel space, which reads the enclosed decision. In case the resource is legitimate
(the entry contains the ACCEPT flag), it checks whether a packet is stored in the
HTTP session table entry corresponding to the TCP session key present in the
verdict queue entry. This packet, if present, is injected back into the networking
stack of the operating system, exactly in the same point of the netfilter chain
where it had been stolen, so that the packet is processed by any other software
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Figure 9: Summarized workflow of the offline module kernel thread.
relying on netfilter (e.g., NAT). The HTTP session table is then updated
by deleting the entry since, as mentioned earlier, the absence of an entry is
interpreted as an ACCEPT verdict. The skbuff structure containing the first
packet of the HTTP response is stored in a memory location managed by the
operating system, hence the offline module leverages the kernel space thread to
access it.
In case the resource is not legitimate (the verdict queue entry contains the
DROP flag), if no packet is found in the HTTP session table entry, the session
status flag is updated to DROP, thus the online module will drop the response
packet when it arrives. If a packet is already stored in the HTTP session queue
entry, the offline module performs the same actions previously described for the
online module in case of a DROP policy. Additionally the packet is dropped, so
that the client cannot reassemble the HTTP response.
Additionally, the last N unauthorized URLs are cached in the offline module.
Each URL is first looked up in the ad-hoc verdict cache and, in case of a hit,
there is no need to interact with the policy server and redirection to the courtesy
web page can be immediately implemented, thus reducing the overhead for the
17
module.
2.7. Communication with the policy server
The U-Filter offline module exploits two different parallel threads to interact
with the policy server, each one using a distinct TCP connection as shown in
Figure 8. The two threads establish the TCP channels when the system starts,
hence enabling the offline module to send immediately a query to the policy
server when needed, without the overhead (and the consequent latency) of the
TCP handshake3.
The offline module exploits these threads to implement an asynchronous
communication with the policy server, separately processing the requests and
the replies without any wait. The first thread cyclically collects every new entry
present in the URL queue and sends the URL and the TCP session identifier
to the policy server, which replies with a message on the second thread, using
the second connection, containing the same Session ID and a single binary in-
formation (ACCEPT/DROP) that is used to push a new entry in the verdict queue.
This solution allows to process as fast as possible both new entries in the URL
queue and new replies from the policy server. The Session ID sent back and
forth is used to correlate the requests with the replies, so that there is no need
to share data between the two threads. Since the requests are sent sequentially,
the policy server can adopt different techniques to efficiently parallelize the pol-
icy checking, such as spawning new threads without the necessity to open a
dedicated TCP connection for each of them.
It is worth noting that most TCP implementations are designed to use the
Nagle algorithm by default, in order to reduce the congestion of the network
and increase bandwidth efficiency at the expense of latency [10]. This algorithm
buffers application data until all the previously sent packets are acknowledged
3The messages sent to and received from the policy server are not intercepted by the
callback of the online module, since they are addressed to the local host and do not cross the
NF IP FORWARD hook, where the callback is registered.
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or the data reach the Maximum Segment Size (MSS). In this way the probability
of having small packets in the network (i.e. packets smaller than the MSS) is
strongly reduced, thus limiting the overhead of TCP headers, allowing for a more
efficient use of transmission links and reducing the burden on routers in terms
of packets per second to be processed. This behavior is particularly harmful for
U-Filter, since both the offline module and the policy server always send very
small packets, that most of the time would be delayed up to one RTT. It is
therefore crucial that the offline module and the policy server disable the Nagle
algorithm (typically with the TCP NODELAY socket option) when establishing the
two connections.
3. Discussion
This section analyzes the proposed technique in terms of possible limitations
(among the others, its applicability to encrypted traffic), and it performs a
theoretical characterization of the delay that can be possibly added by U-Filter
on real network traffic, which will be validated in the next section dedicated to
experimental evaluation.
3.1. General limitations
The proposed solution has been designed with the aim of providing small
delay and low overhead on resource-constrained residential gateways. This was
traded for some limitations compared to more complex solutions adopting a
full-stack HTTP proxy.
The matching process is meant to keep the number of string matching oper-
ations as small as possible, and surely it has to avoid to completely inspect the
entire payload of all the packets in order to identify HTTP messages and extract
URLs in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, this solution does not handle
correctly packets where the HTTP header is not at the beginning of a packet.
This is not a relevant limitation since the problem arises only when HTTP
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pipelining4 is enabled, which is rarely the case in common browsers [11, 12].
The matching algorithm also cannot handle sessions where the header of the
HTTP request spans multiple packets and the necessary fields (e.g., the Host
field) are not on the first one. According to [13], less than the 5% of HTTP
requests are bigger than the common 1500 byte Ethernet maximum transmis-
sion unit. Considering that large HTTP requests are often POST messages
carrying a long payload, e.g., users submitting the content of a form to a web
service5, the possibility that the URL cannot be extracted from the first packet
is presumably much smaller than this amount.
Moreover, various encapsulation techniques (e.g., GRE tunnels) are not sup-
ported by the presented version of the algorithm. These limitations can be
avoided at the cost of additional complexity of the URL extraction procedure.
3.2. HTTPS
HTTPS uses data encryption to guarantee confidentiality, which makes traf-
fic opaque to a possible observer. As a result, any in-network service requiring
visibility into application layer content, such as U-Filter, becomes ineffective.
Several studies [14, 15, 16] have addressed the problem of HTTPS traffic pro-
cessing in middleboxes, which shows that this is a general open problem, not
specific of U-Filter. As a sample general solution, [14] proposes an evolution
of HTTPS that supports the operation of trusted middleboxes while retaining
the security properties of HTTPS. We leave as future work the analysis of the
interaction of U-Filter with such solutions.
We can envision a number of ways to enable U-Filter to operate (possibly
4HTTP pipelining allows a client to send multiple HTTP requests on a single TCP connec-
tion without waiting for the corresponding responses. It requires support in both the client
and the server.
5It is worth noting that this case falls outside the scope of U-Filter, as the apparent URL
submitted in an HTTP POST request contains, in fact, user data. As a consequence, this
would require a more sophisticated filtering mechanism based on a content inspection, not
just URL inspection.
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with limited capabilities) on HTTPS traffic. A first option is to deploy a trusted
proxy [17], such as the one presented in [18], at the cost of a significant processing
overhead, which inevitably limits the performance on a resource constrained
device like a residential gateway, as shown in Section 4.4 with respect to a
similar solution.
Secondly, U-Filter can be extended to inspect unencrypted messages ex-
changed during the TLS session establishment, extract the domain name (from
the fields Common Name, Subject Alternative Name or Server Name Indica-
tion), and enforce a policy according to the extracted value. With this solution
it is possible to block only an entire domain, not just a single resource. It is
worth noticing that a client can resume a previously established TLS connection
with a web server by sending a past TLS session ID in the first message, which
results in an abbreviated handshake without the exchange of the server domain
name. Thus, if the initial connection was not inspected (e.g., because it was
performed on a different, unprotected network), it is not possible to discover
the server domain name by looking only at unencrypted data. Although this
happens only in a quite uncommon network setup, it is to be kept in mind that
the solution is not bullet proof.
As studied by [19], the cost of the security provided by HTTPS is non-
negligible in particular in case of mobile devices and smart objects. In addition,
there are a number of applications for which confidentiality is not strictly re-
quired, for which their users may not willing to pay the additional cost of the
encryption. Therefore a significant fraction of HTTP traffic is expected to re-
main unencrypted in the near future. Although we leave to future work the
architectural and implementation details of a solution to support HTTPS traf-
fic, we envision U-Filter as a low-cost solution for URL filtering on the fast
path of HTTP traffic, while HTTPS traffic can be steered toward a slower path,
where a trusted proxy is used to provide the same level of policy enforcement.
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3.3. Delay characterization
In this section we analyze the additional delay introduced by U-Filter to
identify the components that can be relevant and must be evaluated to quantify
the impact on the user experience.
Specifically, the delay experienced by the end user when requesting a web
page depends on: (i) the time for having a verdict from the policy server TP ,
(ii) the time until the first packet of the response from the webserver is received
TW , (iii) the difference between (i) and (ii) ∆delay, as detailed in Figure 10.
The latency in the communication from the client to the residential gateway is
not relevant in this context since it is not affected by the presence of U-Filter.
Let’s first characterize TP . When U-Filter receives the first packet of an
HTTP request, the online module extracts the URL, pushes a new entry in the
URL queue and sends the HTTP request forward. The entry spends a time
TUqueue in the URL queue, until it is extracted by the offline module and sent
to the policy server, with a time TPreq,tx required to transmit the bits on the
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channel. The verdict is available to the offline module after a Round-Trip Time
RTTP , a time TPproc required by the policy server to check its database and
choose a verdict, and a time TPresp,tx needed to transmit the response into the
channel. At this point, the verdict is stored as a new entry in the verdict queue.
An additional queuing time TV queue lapses before the entry is retrieved by the
offline module kernel thread and the proper action is performed to unlock the
response. As a result, the total delay introduced by the policy checking process
is equal to:
TP = TUqueue + T
P
req,tx + RTT
P + TPproc + T
P
resp,tx + TV queue (1)
Moving now to the characterization of TW , the time required to receive the
first packet of the HTTP response from the web server is given by:
TW = TWreq,tx + RTT
W + TWproc + T
W
resp,tx (2)
where:
• TWreq,tx is the HTTP request transmission time;
• RTTW is the Round-Trip Time with the web server;
• TWproc is the time taken by the web server to provide the HTTP response
(fetch a file, execute server side computation, query a database, etc.);
• TWresp,tx is the time needed to transmit the first packet of the HTTP
response.
The interval:
∆delay = T
P − TW (3)
when positive, is the delay that U-Filter adds to any HTTP request. Exper-
imentally, we observed that TUqueue and TV queue are negligible, since the two
consumer tasks are rather fast. Moreover, TPreq,tx is always less than T
W
req,tx,
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since the request to the policy server contains only a small subset of the data
contained in the HTTP request. Similarly, TPresp,tx is always less than T
W
resp,tx,
since the policy response packet is very small (it consists only of the session
ID and a binary flag). Consequently, the most significant components of the
U-Filter delay are the Round-Trip Times and processing times.
In case ∆delay is negative, the user experience is completely unaffected by
the presence of U-Filter. Even when ∆delay is positive, though, thanks to the
parallelization described in Section 2.7, the overall delay in a web page load time
is not noticeable if the distance and the processing time of the policy server TPproc
are comparable with the ones of common web servers, as shown in Section 4.
4. Experimental validation
In order to validate the proposed solution we conducted a broad range of
experiments. Specifically our goal has been to study the interaction between
the presented algorithm and TCP, as well as the conditions in which a web
page load time is increased, quantifying to what extent the user experience is
affected.
4.1. Testbed setup
We deployed U-Filter on a commercial low-cost residential gateway, a TP-
Link Archer C7 (single core MIPS32 CPU clocked at 720MHz, 16MB Flash,
128MB RAM) running OpenWrt 12.09 [20] with the version 3.3 of the Linux
kernel. OpenWrt is an open source operating system specifically optimized for
the execution on resource constrained residential gateways. As shown in Fig-
ure 11, multiple workstations (whose number and setup varies according to the
specific test) acting as clients are connected on a Gigabit Ethernet LAN repre-
senting the “domestic side” of the residential gateway. Another 1 Gbps interface
(“WAN side”) hosts the policy server and the traffic sink of our experiments,
which is represented by a web server during TCP interaction and throughput
experiments or a vanilla Internet connectivity when evaluating browsing expe-
rience. All the workstations and the servers are equipped with an Intel Core
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Figure 11: Testbed setup.
i7-4770 CPU and 32GB of main memory in order to guarantee not to become
the bottleneck.
Since a production-grade policy server is not in the scope of this work, we
use a policy server that gives always a positive verdict, with a customizable
delay in order to simulate the processing time. Moreover, in the policy server
we use Linux Traffic Control (tc) to add a custom delay to any outgoing packet
in order to simulate various network RTTs.
To generate single HTTP requests we use curl and ab [21], while for real-
life simulations we start multiple VMs on the workstations to emulate multiple
end-users. Each VM runs an instance of WebTrafficGenerator6, an automation
tool that can drive a web browser to replay a user browsing history. For ev-
ery entry in the provided browsing history, the browser loads a complete web
page (i.e. retrieving the web page with all the associated resources such as
images, javascript files, etc.)7. In this respect, WebTrafficGenerator can also
issue HTTPS requests, which happens when a page, appearing in HTTP in the
browsing history, includes content that has to be retrieved using an encrypted
connection. The time between multiple web page requests, a.k.a. the Thinking
6https://github.com/netgroup-polito/WebTrafficGenerator
7The community have not yet reached a consensus on when a web page should be considered
completely loaded. Particularly, WebTrafficGenerator considers a page complete when the
javascript “onload” event is fired on the “body” HTML tag.
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Time, is randomly selected using a random variable with the same statistical
distribution as the actual thinking time of the user as measured from his/her
browsing history. A realistic thinking time is required not only to simulate a
real user behavior, but also to avoid that web services (e.g. Google) recognize
that the client is an automaton and thus provide a different response web page
with the intent of testing whether or not the user is human. In the event that a
new request must start before the previous web page is completely loaded, the
tool creates a different browser window, in order to load multiple web pages in
parallel (which simulates multi-tabbing).
4.2. Interaction with TCP
This section shows how the TCP algorithm reacts when one specific packet
(the first packet of an HTTP response) is repeatedly lost on its way to the
destination, for a certain amount of time. The aim of this analysis is to show
that U-Filter has been designed taking into mind the peculiar characteristics of
the TCP protocol, hence our algorithm that possibly delays the first packet of
the HTTP response does not cause additional delay in the TCP data exchange.
To reduce external interferences, in this test we use a web server directly
connected to the WAN interface of the gateway (as shown in Figure 11a) running
the Apache HTTP Server 2.4.7 ; TW measured in this setup is less than 1 ms,
thus we can consider ∆delay = T
P . Moreover, in this test the Linux Traffic
Control (tc) in the policy server is disabled, hence the RTT is negligible and we
can consider TP = TPproc. A client workstation runs curl to request a 512 KB
web page stored on the webserver. The gateway executes U-Filter with a fixed
TPproc ≈ 100 ms delay in the policy server response. As detailed in Section 2.5
and 2.6, only the first packet of any HTTP response is buffered by U-Filter. In
the scenario created for these experiments, such packet is eventually forwarded
to the client about 100 ms after the HTTP GET request traverses the residential
gateway. All subsequent packets are forwarded correctly. We capture the traffic
on both the LAN and WAN links of the residential gateway and extract the
sequence numbers (SEQ) of the TCP segments from the web server to the client
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and the acknowledgment numbers (ACK) of the ones from the client to the
webserver, together with their timestamp. The resulting data are presented in
Figure 12 (the SEQ and ACK numbers are relative).
This experiment enables us to observe how a TCP connection progresses
during the U-Filter operation. The presented results show that, while the first
TCP segment of the HTTP response is blocked, the server TCP endpoint sends
the subsequent segments as well as duplicates of the first segment (visible only
on the WAN side, in Figure 12a), until the TCP window is full. As expected,
the TCP receiver repeatedly acknowledges the segment arrived before the one
missing (Figure 12c); specifically one ACK is sent for each of the subsequent seg-
ments received out of sequence. All the modern TCP implementations include
the TCP selective acknowledgment (SACK) option [22] in the duplicated ACK,
which is used to selectively acknowledge correctly received segments logically
following the missing one(s). Thanks to the selective acknowledgments, these
segments are not re-transmitted, as it happens for the blocked segment, as the
traditional Go-Back-N algorithm would require. When the blocked packet is
released (after 100 ms in our experiment, as shown in Figure 12b) and properly
delivered, all the previously received segments are cumulatively acknowledged
and the transmission can continue from a new segment (Figure 12c).
Abiding by TCP Fast retransmit [23] algorithm, the web server re-sends the
blocked segment for every 3 duplicated acknowledgments. These re-transmitted
segments are the only overhead induced by U-Filter. In our test these dupli-
cates amount to 12.8% of the packets sent by the server during ∆delay, and
half that number if we consider all the packets transmitted during the same
interval; however, considering the entire lifespan of the TCP connection, this
overhead accounts (in average) no more than 1.6% of all the packets, which can
be considered negligible.
From the point of view of the users’ experience, selective acknowledgments
are particularly beneficial because, even if the policy server replies after the web
server (i.e. ∆delay is positive), the actual delay perceived by the user is smaller
than ∆delay because several TCP segments are correctly received during the
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∆delay interval and are ready to be used to render the web page as soon as the
missing segment is delivered.
4.3. Browsing experience
This section presents the results of several tests executed in a realistic sce-
nario to show how much a real user browsing experience is affected by U-Filter.
Using the testbed in Figure 11b, we launched WebTrafficGenerator in 6 VMs
(running on 2 workstations) in order to simulate 6 users simultaneously brows-
ing the Internet. This number of concurrent users is reasonable for a residential
gateway. Moreover, with a large number of users, the browsing experience would
be limited by the network speed. As expected, the latency of the policy server
proved to be the parameter that has the greater impact on the user-perceived
performance of U-Filter.
In every test, a single VM browses 600 web pages collected from the browsing
histories of 30 anonymous users (we consider only web pages downloaded using
HTTP, since those using HTTPS are irrelevant for U-Filter). In order to use
realistic values for the policy server processing time and RTT, we analyzed
several traffic traces captured using Tstat [24] during 24 hours in 4 different
points of presence (POPs) of an Internet Service Provider and extracted the
median and 90th percentile values for the RTT of HTTP requests and processing
time of web servers. Tstat infers the RTT from the POP to an endpoint by
measuring the inter-arrival time of a packet and its acknowledgment and infers
a web server processing time by measuring the interval between the arrival of
the acknowledgment for the request and the arrival of the first response packet.
In fact, a host’s operating system usually sends a TCP ACK as soon as a packet
is received.
Table 1 shows the statistical values for the RTTs from a client to the POP
and from a client to the destination server, supposedly in a data center (DC).
We use these values in our tests to simulate the RTT in the case that the policy
server is either in the POP or in a remote data center. Additionally Table 2
shows the statistical values of the processing time for web servers. These values
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Table 1: Inferred RTT values with the policy server in different locations (RTTP ).
Location Type of measure RTT
POP
Median 25 ms
90th percentile 100 ms
Data Center (DC)
Median 45 ms
90th percentile 200 ms
Table 2: Inferred policy server latency values (TPproc).
Type of measure Latency
Median 2 ms
90th percentile 80 ms
are used to simulate the processing time of the policy server: since the operations
performed are somewhat similar (parsing of a request, look up in a database,
preparation of a response), we assume the complexity to be comparable with
(or even lower than) the one of any web server.
At the end of a test, WebTrafficGenerator provides a file containing a sum-
mary of various aspects of every request. Among the provided values, we are
interested in the complete page load time (the time needed to load the web
page with all its resources, such as pictures, libraries, etc.) and the timings of
the individual HTTP requests issued to get the main HTML page and the
associated resources.
4.3.1. Individual HTTP requests
The timing of an HTTP request is the sum of multiple components, such
as the queuing time, the DNS resolution time, the connection setup time, etc.
The only component that can be affected by U-Filter is the time spent waiting
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Figure 13: Waiting time for a single HTTP resource - Cumulative distribution function.
for a response from the server (waiting time), equal to max{TP , TW }, if the
RTT between the client and the gateway is negligible. Figure 13 shows the
cumulative distribution of the waiting time for HTTP requests with different
values of RTT and processing time (latency) for the policy server, together with
the baseline (i.e., the latency without U-Filter) and the case in which the policy
server immediately provides verdicts (in which case the delay TP is negligible),
as if U-Filter and the policy server are on the same LAN.
These results show that U-Filter adds a negligible delay if the policy server
provides an immediate response, therefore proving our claim that the online
module does not introduce noticeable overhead in the traffic processing. On the
other hand, when the policy server response is received after a certain amount
of time, the cumulative distribution is shifted toward that value, since all the
HTTP responses that arrived earlier are delayed by U-Filter. In summary, the
impact of U-Filter on the single resource loading time is highly dependent on
the distance from the policy server and its processing time.
Considering only the worst case (i.e., the 90th percentile of the processing
time and RTT with the policy server in a data center), we show in Figure 14
the waiting time for each requested HTTP resource, with and without U-Filter.
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Figure 14: Resource waiting time considering the 90th percentile of the processing time and
RTT with the policy server in a data center.
The figure shows a cluster of requests on the horizontal line corresponding to
the delay TP , supporting the conclusion that this delay highly influences the
loading time of a single resources.
Both figures show that, even with U-Filter, some resources are received be-
fore the policy server delay (TP ≈ RTTP + TPproc). This happens because some
resources are retrieved through HTTPS, even if the main HTML page is on
HTTP, therefore they do not experience the policy server delay.
4.3.2. Complete pages
Figure 15 shows the cumulative distribution function of the complete web
page load time, while Figure 16 shows for every requested URL the relation
between the complete page loading time with and without U-Filter, in the worst
conditions (policy server in the data center, 90th percentile values for RTT and
latency). These results show that the impact caused by the presence of U-Filter
is not noticeable, therefore we can assert that the overall page loading time is
not affected by U-Filter and also the browsing experience is unaltered.
This is justified by the fact that multiple resources are requested in parallel
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Figure 15: Complete page loading time cumulative distribution.
by the browsers, hence the policy server processes all the requests concurrently.
As a result, the increase in the overall time for loading the complete web page
is not dependent on the number of resources and is, in any case, approximately
equal to a single policy server delay TP . Since the time needed to receive, parse
and render the main HTML web page and all its resources is usually an order
of magnitude greater than the policy server delay, the added latency (and the
impact of U-Filter on the browsing experience) is in effect negligible.
4.4. Residential gateway aggregated throughput
In this section we evaluate the overhead introduced by U-Filter by compar-
ing the average aggregated throughput of the residential gateway in 3 scenarios:
(i) without a URL filtering service in place, (ii) with U-Filter and (iii) with
Tinyproxy [25], a URL filtering solution for OpenWrt based on a lightweight
HTTP proxy that intercepts and analyzes all the outgoing web traffic and can
operate in either explicit or transparent (a.k.a. man-in-the-middle) mode. These
experiments assess the impact of U-Filter with respect to the maximum forward-
ing capabilities of the residential gateway, which is basically limited by the CPU
consumption of the on-board software.
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These experiments employ the testbed setup depicted in Figure 11a; the
policy server is configured to simulate a deployment in a data center with the
median processing time and RTT, while the web server has the same RTT. The
client workstation uses ab to request files of different sizes from the web server;
each file is requested 100 times. As suggested by the HTTP/1.1 standard [26]
with respect to persistent HTTP connections, each client issues two concurrent
requests toward the server. The goal of this experiment is to evaluate how
much packet inspection and policy checking in the residential gateway affects
the download speed and the latency. We show in Figure 17 the minimum,
maximum and average application-level throughput for the 3 scenarios, while in
Figure 18 we show the time needed to download the entire file.
These results show that the throughput and the download speed reached
with U-Filter are higher than with Tinyproxy for files larger than 8 KB, while
for small files the two solutions show the same level of performance. In fact,
with very small files, we experience an additional small delay with U-Filter,
compared to the baseline. We ascribe this delay to the time needed for the
context switch between the online and offline module, given that the residential
gateway has a single core. This delay is negligible for larger files, for which
35
U-Filter provides almost the same performance reached without the filtering
service in place. We expect that a residential gateway with at least a dual core
processor would not experience this delay, therefore U-Filter would provide the
same level of performance as the baseline. However, even with a single core
gateway, the impact of U-Filter on the download time is only 3% with large files
and never exceeds 54%, while Tinyproxy has an overhead ranging from 44%
to a remarkable 322%. As an example, the download of a 1 GB file requires
approximately 1 minute and 12 seconds without a filtering service, 6 seconds
longer with U-Filter and more than 5 minutes with Tinyproxy.
It is worth mentioning that U-Filter can easily implement a whitelist contain-
ing the IP addresses of trusted devices whose traffic should not be filtered. This
is a useful feature that allows to avoid the additional delay for delay-sensitive
clients.
4.5. Memory footprint
Given the limitations in terms of available memory in current residential
gateways, we extracted the number of pending entries in the HTTP session
table every time a new HTTP request was received and plotted the resulting
probability distribution in Figure 19 in order to assess the impact of U-Filter in
terms of memory consumption. The observed values confirm the small memory
footprint of U-Filter: even in the worst case, the number of pending entries are
always less than a hundred. In the case in which every entry stores a packet
(usually 1518 bytes at most), together with IP addresses (8 bytes), TCP ports (4
bytes) and a binary session flag, the HTTP session table requires less than 200
KB of main memory, a value far below the memory size of low-end residential
gateways (usually in the order of at least tens of MB).
5. Related work
Currently several solutions for filtering traffic based on URLs are available
commercially or as open source packages, often used as parental control or ad
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Figure 19: U-Filter load.
block. Many are based on software executing on the client machine to control
outgoing traffic. Among them, it is worth mentioning k9 Web Protection [27],
a powerful free software for URL filtering that comes with a large database of
URL categorization data. New websites are categorized in real-time and their
information published on a server that is used to update the local database.
This software needs to be installed on any device that must be protected and is
tuned to run on common PC hardware.
Among existing parental control solutions that do not require execution of
a software agent on clients, some are based on applying the filtering policing
in the DNS server [28]. While this is a low complexity and efficient solution
that enables achieving high performance, it is not effective as it can be easily
bypassed choosing a different DNS server. Moreover, filtering is based on server
domain names rather than URLs, as required when the same server or name
domain can deliver both appropriate and inappropriate content, such as in case
of public services like facebook.com.
As an alternative approach, filtering policies can be applied by network ap-
pliances on the path of the protected client traffic. Blue Coat WebFilter [29] is
a sophisticated URL filtering solution that runs on business level network appli-
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ances and provides policy enforcement on web traffic, blocking malware down-
loads and web threats. WebFilter combines URL filtering and anti-malware
technologies, exploiting an engine with a local rule database continuously up-
dated from a remote master database. The engine detects hidden malware and
provides reputation and web content categorization based on input from actual
users.
None of the above-mentioned solutions is designed to run on resource-con-
strained devices, such as a typical residential gateway, which would not ensure
acceptable performance when executing computationally intense tasks. Among
the efforts to integrate web filtering service in low-end residential gateways, the
ones related to the OpenWrt platform are noteworthy, such as Tinyproxy [25].
Tinyproxy can filter HTTP requests checking their URL against a list of regu-
lar expressions contained in a local file, which may be rather big and needs to
be frequently updated. A similar technology has been proposed in [18], where
an access gateway performs mobile app policy enforcement deploying a trans-
parent HTTPS proxy to gain access to encrypted traffic, extract relevant field
values, and pass them to an external policy-checking module. However, de-
ployment of an HTTP proxy is critical on resource-constrained devices since it
must terminate all the TCP connections, pair them with new TCP connections
with the remote endpoint, parse every packet, identify and extract patterns of
interest, and match them against a large blacklist. Therefore it becomes easily
a bottleneck with high traffic loads, thus impacting user experience.
The work presented in [30] represents an attempt to perform efficient HTTP
traffic filtering in OpenWrt. The authors propose a two-tier architecture, with
a kernel module that intercepts and analyzes HTTP traffic and a user-space
process in charge of policy compliance checking. The computational load of
the user space module, that performs string matching on URLs, grows with
the length of the list of rules, and so does the introduced delay. Consequently,
when this approach is implemented on a residential gateway with limited re-
sources, only short lists can be supported without user experience degradation,
thus limiting the effectiveness of the policy enforcement system. Moreover, the
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proposed architecture makes it difficult for a trusted third-party to push real-
time updates to the local database in order to ensure prompt detection of newly
discovered threats. Finally, the URL analysis is performed by each edge systems
in isolation, hence excluding the possibility of a (centralized) cross-correlation
mechanism that identifies new threats by analyzing URLs requested from dif-
ferent sources.
Traffic processing in residential gateways has been proposed also in the con-
text of Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [31, 32]. An existing NFV infras-
tructure can employ residential gateways to deploy lightweight Native Network
Functions [33] or eBPF data plane programs [34], in order to provide delay-
sensitive services to the user, while computation intensive services are hosted
in the data center of the service operator. This solution offers flexibility in the
type and number of network services that can be provided and represents an
interesting target platform for the deployment of U-Filter.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents U-Filter, a distributed system for efficient HTTP traffic
filtering in resource-constrained residential gateways. Leveraging an external
policy server and an intelligent combination of kernel and user space process-
ing (and a careful implementation), U-Filter is able to inspect the URL in
every HTTP request and block unwanted web pages with a very small memory
footprint and processing overhead. This makes U-Filter appropriate for the de-
ployment on resource-constrained devices and also reduces at a minimum the
additional delay introduced on page download, which leaves the overall browsing
experience of the user practically unaltered.
Since U-Filter operates on a packet-by-packet basis, it assumes that the en-
tire HTTP header is on the same packet. This makes URL extraction easier and
avoids to have to store additional information to correlate subsequent packets.
Since the maximum size of an IP packet is usually 1500 bytes, this does not
represent a problem in a real scenario, as confirmed by [13].
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The policy server, where multiple mechanisms and optimizations can be
implemented, was purposely kept outside of the scope of this work as it involves a
completely different set of challenges and solutions. Similarly, we did not address
how providing additional information to the residential gateway can increase its
efficiency in caching verdicts, thus reducing the number of interrogations. The
study of such improvements is left to future work. Other future directions will
involve evaluating the performance improvement achievable by deploying U-
Filter on real-time linux kernels [35, 36], as well as investigating the benefits
that stem from deploying U-Filter in novel and currently strategic fields such as
IoT [37] and Big Data [38].
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